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THE LAW OF TORTS
I. COURT OF APPEALS ADOPTS RESTATEMENT APPROACH TO
DETERMINE AN ACCOUNTANT'S DUTY TO THIRD PARTY INVESTORS
In ML-Lee Acquisition Fund v. Deloitte & Touche1 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 view on the
scope of public accountants' duties to third persons who use and rely on their
reports. 3 In issuing this opinion, South Carolina joins those states that
subscribe to the majority view, including Georgia and North Carolina.4
Section 552 of the Restatement provides that an accountant's duty is limited
to the client and third parties upon whom the accountant or client intends to
confer the benefit of compiled information. This duty necessarily extends
beyond those in privity or near-privity with the accountant, but does not reach
so far as to impose liability when the accountant only knows of a possibility
of distribution with subsequent reliance on the report.5 The scope of accoun-
tants' duties to third parties who use and rely on their information was a
matter of first impression in South Carolina.6
The ML-Lee controversy centered around Emb-Tex Corporation (Emb-
Tex), a heavily leveraged textile facility. Emb-Tex employed Deloitte &
Touche (Deloitte) as its accounting firm from 1983 until the end of 1990. With
an eye toward attracting outside investors, Emb-Tex hired the New York
investment banking firm Kidder, Peabody (Kidder), which in turn contacted
ML-Lee's investment advisor, Thomas H. Lee Company, Inc. (Lee Advisor).
Kidder eventually developed an offering memorandum for Lee Advisor that
incorporated the audited financial statements prepared by Deloitte for 1983 to
1986. On March 1, 1988, based on Lee Advisor's evaluation, the ML-Lee
partners voted their approval of an Emb-Tex investment strategy.7
1. _ S.C. _, 463 S.E.2d 618 (Ct. App. 1995), cert. granted, No. 2391, Davis Ad. Sh.
No. 23 (S.C. Aug. 24, 1996).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
3. ML-Lee, _ S.C. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 627.
4. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (en banc); Badische Corp.
v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland,
367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988); Daniel J. Barrison, Comment, State Blue Sky Laws: AnAlternative
to the Federal Securities Laws and State Common Law in Third-Party Accountant Malpractice
Cases, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 601 (1984); Denise M. Orlinski, Note, AnAccountant'sLiability to Third
Parties: Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 859 (1994). But see Jack W. Shaw,
Jr., Annotation, Liability of Public Accountant to Third Parties, 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972)
(concluding that the generally accepted view is the privity rule, but recognizing that as of 1972
a few courts were beginning to challenge this rule based primarily on the Restatement view).
5. ML-Lee, _ S.C. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 625.
6. Id. at _,463 S.E.2d at 625.
7. Id. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 621-22.
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Peat Marwick, hired by Lee Advisor to review Emb-Tex's records,
discovered that the 1987 audit prepared by Deloitte contained some inventory
overstatements and an unusual inventory valuation method. Following up on
this discovery, Lee Advisor wrote a letter to Emb-Tex offering a commitment
to invest, but expressly conditioned the offer on the fulfillment of several
requirements, including a comfort letter.8 Deloitte issued the comfort letter,
subject to certain disclaimers.9 The letter assured ML-Lee that nothing had
come to its attention suggesting that the unaudited financial statements for the
first four months of 1988 were prepared in nonconformance with generally
accepted accounting principles. The comfort letter also confirmed that there
was no evidence of any increase in long-term debt or decrease in stockholder's
equity or total assets (as compared to the 1987 statement). The parties closed
the transaction on May 24, 1988.1"
On November 2, 1988, Lee Advisor recommended an additional $2
million investment. Lee Advisor based this recommendation on the Deloitte
audited financial statements for 1988 and draft financial statements for 1989.
In late November 1990, a Deloitte auditor discovered that the Emb-Tex
inventory had possibly been overvalued and reported this information to
Deloitte partner David Sutton."
Within a week, Sutton participated in a conference call with Warren Smith
of Lee Advisor and learned of ML-Lee's proposed additional investment.
Sutton opined to Smith that ML-Lee had become Deloitte's new client with
respect to the audit work and that the inventory was problematic, but he failed
to mention the overvaluation. Deloitte withdrew from its relationship with
Emb-Tex on December 3, 1990. ML-Lee closed its additional investment on
December 11, 1990. In February 1991, a former Emb-Tex controller sent
letters to Deloitte and ML-Lee revealing the inventory overstatement. 12
ML-Lee filed an action against Deloitte alleging professional negligence
and negligent misrepresentation. In granting Deloitte's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts view on
public accountants' duties to third persons. As a matter of law, the lower court
8. Lee Advisor requested the comfort letter for assurance that the contemplated transactions
would not be avoidable under any bankruptcy or fraudulent conveyance law. Id. at _, 463
S.E.2d at 622.
9. The letter stated: "The foregoing procedures do not constitute an examination made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and they would not necessarily reveal
matters of significance with respect to the comments in the following paragraph. Accordingly,
we make no representations as to the sufficiency of the foregoing procedures for [ML-Lee's]
purposes." Id. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 622.
10. Id. at -' 463 S.E.2d at 622-23.
11. Id. at , 463 S.E.2d at 623.
12. Emb-Tex's president had overstated the inventory from December 1985 through
September 1989 by $2.5 million to $4 million. Id. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 624.
[Vol. 48
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concluded that Deloitte did not owe a duty to ML-Lee and that ML-Lee did
not rely on Deloitte's audit reports.13
Upon review, the court of appeals considered the three major approaches
United States jurisdictions have developed on the issue of accountant liability
to third parties.' 4 The first, and most restrictive, is the approach originally
applied by Judge Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche," which requires
strict contractual privity before liability may be imposed. The New York Court
of Appeals relaxed this rule somewhat in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Aurthur
Anderson & Co.,6 extending protection to a third party engaged with an
accountant in a relationship sufficiently approaching privity. The relaxed
standard has become known as the New York "near privity" rule.
The second approach recognized was the foreseeability approach, which
holds accountants liable to any reasonably foreseeable third party who might
obtain and rely on the accountant's information. This subjects accountants to
liability on the same basis as other tort-feasors. 17
The appellate court then considered and eventually settled upon a third
approach, the majority view, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 552.18 In short, the Restatement view extends accountants' liability
13. Id. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 627-29.
14. The North Carolina Supreme Court enunciated four approaches in Raritan River Steel Co.
v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988), upon which the AL-Lee court
heavily relied. See MI-Lee, _ S.C. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 625-28. The additional fourth
approach requires the balancing of various factors. Such a "balancing" method was first
introduced by the California Supreme Court in Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
Some of the relevant factors considered by the Biakanja court included:
[Tihe extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foresee-
ability of harm to [the plaintiff], the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of
preventing future harm.
Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19, quoted in Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 615.
The Missouri Court of Appeals borrowed some of these factors to develop its own "four
factor" test. Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
see also Barrison, supra note 4, at 609 (distinguishing the Missouri "four factor" test as a
separate approach); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accountants § 25 (1994) (discussing four general approaches
and adding to the "factor" test various additional factors that some states consider, including the
following: the proportion the injury bears to the culpability of the tort-feasor, unreasonableness
of the burden that potential for fraudulent claims resulting from allowance of recovery would
place on the tort-feasor, the allowance of recovery, and the likelihood that allowance of recovery
would create a precedent that has no sensible or just stopping point).
15. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
16. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
17. MI-Lee, _ S.C. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 625.
18. The court quoted the following language:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
1996]
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to those third parties who are intended to rely on the information. The court
balanced various public policy considerations before determining that the
Restatement's expansive view on the scope of an accountant's liability is
consistent with today's expansive uses for an accountant's work product.
Imposing liability beyond parties in privity will force accountants to issue their
information with greater caution. The court also noted that the Restatement
view limits liability more than the foreseeability approach. Such a limitation
is desirable because public policy opposes potentially expansive liability to
unknown third parties. 9 Finally, the court concluded that, because the
Restatement approach is in agreement with a previous supreme court
decision and because the court of appeals has relied on section 552 in other
negligent misrepresentation cases, 2 the approach should be adopted by South
Carolina.'
Although the court of appeals determined that the trial court correctly
adopted the Restatement approach, it found that the trial court's application of
section 552, which resulted in summary judgment for Deloitte on all issues,
was not entirely correct. The reviewing court first addressed whether Deloitte
owed ML-Lee a duty under the Restatement and then briefly discussed whether
the evidence was sufficient to show genuine issues of material fact with regard
to reliance by ML-Lee. The court analyzed separately each of the major
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating die
information.
(2) ... Mhe liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to
supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
Id. at __, 463 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977)).
19. Id. at __, 463 S.E.2d at 626-27.
20. South Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 376-77,
346 S.E.2d 324, 325-26 (1986) (holding that a duty was owed if a party knew or should have
known that information he conferred was intended to be used by a third party in a certain way,
but no duty arose through foreseeability alone, and no duty is owed to those distantly affected),
cited with approval in ML-Lee, __ S.C. at __, 463 S.E.2d at 627.
21. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. Bank v. Knauss, 296 S.C. 136, 140, 370 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that, although the concept of negligent misrepresentation as described in the
Restatement is not new to South Carolina, the facts of this case do not establish it); Winburn v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 287 S.C. 435, 441-42, 339 S.E.2d 142, 146-47 (Ct. App. 1985)
(discussing recovery for negligent misrepresentation, but holding that insurance adjuster had not
negligently misrepresented mechanic's competence).
22. ML-Lee, S.C. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 627.
[Vol. 48
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factual events: (1) the first investment of $16 million and (2) the additional $2
million investment. The $16 million investment was subdivided into the
following stages: (a) 1985 and 1986 audit reports, (b) 1987 audit report, and
(c) the comfort letter.
The court found that because ML-Lee did not even exist until the end of
1987, Deloitte owed no duty to ML-Lee for the 1985 and 1986 reports.
Neither Deloitte nor Emb-Tex could possibly have intended ML-Lee to benefit
from the reports. The court further explained that ML-Lee could not step into
the shoes of a previous creditor to take advantage of the "substantially similar
transaction" provision of the Restatement.23 Essentially, the court held that
the provision "does not . . . expand the knowledge requirement to impose
liability where the accountant's work is furnished to unknown third par-
ties."24 Though the transaction may change in character or degree, the parties
must remain the same.
The court found that Deloitte did owe ML-Lee a duty with regard to the
1987 report and the comfort letter. Deloitte had knowledge at the time it
issued the 1987 report that Emb-Tex was negotiating to replace and restructure
a previous debt. Although Deloitte did not know the actual identity of the
intended creditor, it had enough information to create a duty.' Furthermore,
Deloitte addressed the comfort letter specifically to ML-Lee; therefore, a duty
arose under the Restatement requiring that the information be free from
negligent or intentional misrepresentations.26
Next discussing the $2 million additional investment, the court decided
that when Deloitte discovered the overvaluation of inventory, a duty arose for
Deloitte to inform ML-Lee of the error. The court based this decision not on
the Restatement, but on South Carolina common law. In particular, the court
relied heavily on their decision in Ardis v. Cox,27 which held that a duty to
disclose may arise when one party "expressly reposes a trust and confidence"
in another party regarding a particular transaction.28
As for the general question of reliance, the trial court had concluded that
because Lee Advisor was the party who actually used the Deloitte reports,
ML-Lee itself could not satisfy reliance elements, inherent in all its claims,
based on a theory of imputed reliance from Lee Advisor.29 In frank disagree-
23. See supra note 18 for the exact language of the provision.
24. ML-Lee, _ S.C. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 628.
25. Id. at -, 463 S.E.2d at 629-30.
26. The trial court did not discuss whether the information provided in the comfort letter was
actually misrepresentative, so the question was remanded for resolution by ajury. Id. at _, 463
S.E.2d at 630.
27. 314 S.C. 512, 431 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1993).
28. Id. at 517, 431 S.E.2d at 270 (quoting Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 585, 155
S.E.2d 601, 605 (1967)).
29. ML-Lee's inability to show reliance was found to be an independent ground for summary
19961
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ment, the court of appeals decided that Lee Advisor was an agent of ML-Lee;
therefore, Lee Advisor's reliance could be imputed to the principal." The
court, however, found that genuine issues of material fact remained as to
whether Lee Advisor, as an agent, had actually relied on Deloitte's informa-
tion in the context of the 1987 report and the comfort letter.3 '
Recent decisions adopting Restatement section 552 have opened the door
to potential liability for professionals other than accountants. One such
possibility involves title abstractors. 31 In this context, use of section 552
allows a third party to maintain a cause of action based on the tort of negligent
misrepresentation despite a lack of privity with the title abstractor.33 North
Carolina's United Leasing Corp. v. Miller34 is a case exemplifying this point.
In Miller the court allowed a lessor to maintain a cause of action against the
lessor's lawyer and his law firm for the negligent preparation of a title
abstract. 35 The court disavowed the privity requirement, concluding:
[B]y entering into a contract with A, the defendant may place himself in
such a relation toward B that the law will impose upon him an obligation,
sounding in tort and not in contract, to act in such a way that B will not
be injured. The incidental fact of the existence of the contract with A does
not negative the responsibility of the actor when he enters upon a course
of affirmative conduct which may be expected to affect the interests of
another person.
36
Holdings like that in Miller become more important when one considers the
influence of North Carolina law in this general area.37 Together, the
expansionist trend of Miller and the approving tone of ML-Lee should raise
judgment below. The trial court incorrectly applied Learjet Corp. v. Spenlinhauer, 901 F.2d 198
(1st Cir. 1990), which held that indirect reliance is permitted for fraudulent misrepresentation,
but not negligent misrepresentation. ML-Lee, _ S.C. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 632-33.
30. "Where a fraud is worked upon an agent by a third person, either by misrepresentation
or by silence, the fraud is considered as worked upon the principal, and the latter has a right of
action against the third person." 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 298 (1986), quoted in ML-Lee, _
S.C. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 632.
31. ML-Lee, _ S.C. at_, 463 S.E.2d at 633.
32. William B. Johnson, Annotation, Negligence in Preparing Abstract of Title as Ground of
Liability to One Other Than Person Ordering Abstract, 50 A.L.R.4th 314 (1986).
33. Id. at 320.
34. 263 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
35. Id. at 318. The lawyer prepared an abstract for the lessee but failed to discover the
existence of a lien that was issued as collateral by the lessee for execution of a leasing agreement
with the lessor. Id. at 315.
36. Id. at 317 (quoting Shoffner Indus., Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 257 S.E.2d 50, 58
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 93,
at 622 (4th ed. 1971))).
37. See supra note 14.
[Vol. 48
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some concern as to how attorneys will be affected by future applications of
section 552.
Real estate appraisers are also susceptible to third party liability under the
Restatement. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, following the reasoning
set forth in Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland,38 held that
section 552 is the appropriate standard under which to assess a real estate
appraiser's liability.39
Most jurisdictions are leaving behind the "privity" or "near privity"
approach in favor of the Restatement approach. By following North Carolina
and the majority of states, South Carolina has made an important step in
defining its position on the scope of an accountant's liability to third parties.
The possibility of finding other professionals, including attorneys, liable to
third parties under section 552 is also an important ramification of the MI-Lee
decision. North Carolina case law seems especially relevant for South Carolina
practitioners in predicting how cases will be adjudicated under the Restatement
approach.
Daniel W. Hayes
38. 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988).
39. Ballance v. Rinehart, 412 S.E.2d 106, 109 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that plaintiff's
complaint failed to state a claim under section 552).
19961
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II. SOUTH CAROLINA REJECTS THE
LOST CHANCE DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
In Jones v. Owings' the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a medical malpractice plaintiff may recover damages when
a delay in proper diagnosis or treatment results in a patient's being deprived
of a less than an even chance of surviving or recovering. The court rejected
the lost chance doctrine, which would allow such a patient to recover
damages, and held that the plaintiff must show that the "defendant's negli-
gence, in probability, proximately caused" the injuries alleged.' Thus, even
when the defendant physician performs in a clearly negligent manner causing
the patient to lose a fifty percent chance of survival, the patient may recover
nothing in South Carolina.
B. BACKGROUND ON THE LOST CHANCE DOCTRINE
Although an exhaustive discussion of the lost chance doctrine is beyond
the scope of this note, a brief overview of its theoretical origins and present
status will provide a useful backdrop for an examination of South Carolina's
position on the issue.
1. Causation in Medical Malpractice Actions
The standard of causation in personal injury tort actions has traditionally
adhered to the "more likely than not" rule.' In a medical malpractice action,
this means that a plaintiff must produce evidence that more probably than not
the defendant physician negligence caused the patient's injury.4 Challenges to
this standard have arisen in situations involving a patient with some pre-
existing condition that the physician fails to treat with due care, thereby
allowing the condition to worsen. A particularly common scenario begins with
the physician's negligently failing to diagnose a tumor on the patient's first
visit. Six months later, the physician discovers the tumor, which eventually
1. __ S.C. _, 456 S.E.2d 371 (1995).
2. Id. at -, 456 S.E.2d at 373.
3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 41, at 269
(5th ed. 1984).
4. See Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. 1978) ("the preponderance of the
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leads to the patient's death. With proper diagnosis at the first visit, the patient
would have had a forty percent chance of surviving. But by visit two, the
cancer had spread, and the patient's chances diminished to five percent.
Without doubt, the cancer causes the patient's death, but the physician's
negligence causes a severe reduction in the patient's chance of surviving.
In such cases the traditional more-likely-than-not standard works a harsh
result in the eyes of many courts. These courts believe that the traditional
standard would result in "a blanket release from liability for doctors and
hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival,
regardless of how flagrant the negligence."' Such concerns have led these
courts to endorse an alternative approach.
2. Approaches to Lost Chance Situations
6
a. Proportional Approach
The proportional approach, generally credited to Professor Joseph King,
allows recovery even if with proper care the plaintiff's chance of recovery
would not have exceeded fifty percent. The plaintiff, however, cannot recover
all of her damages; instead, recovery is limited to the proportion of the total
amount of serious injury or death-related damages reflecting the reduced
chance.' For example, if a patient had a forty percent chance of recovering
from breast cancer and a negligent physician's misdiagnosis results in her
chances dropping to ten percent, then the plaintiff can recover thirty percent
of her total death-related injuries. Thus, if her damages totaled $100,000, the
plaintiff could recover $30,000. Currently, eleven states follow this ap-
proach. 9
Courts have used several theories to reach this proportional recovery
result. Professor King defines the percentage decrease in the patient's chance
5. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. 1983) (en
bane).
6. Categorizing courts' responses to lost chance situations has proven to be a difficult task
for commentators and courts alike. Confusion arises from differences among the jurisdictions in
naming the approaches and because some courts fail to explain clearly which approach they are
adopting. In addition, some courts adopt a hybrid of two of the approaches, making it difficult
to pigeon-hole their response into any of the existing categories. For purposes of this discussion,
the labels used by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Jones v. Owings will be used herein with
attempts made throughout to alert the reader as to possible variations among other jurisdictions.
7. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal njury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).
8. Id. at 1360; see also MeKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 476 (Okla.
1987) (holding that "[t]he amount of damages recoverable is equal to the percent of chance lost
multiplied by the total amount of damages which are ordinarily allowed in a wrongful death
action").
9. See Appendix A for state by state breakdown.
[Vol.48
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of recovery as a compensable injury.'* To recover, the plaintiff must show
that more likely than not the defendant's negligence caused the reduction in the
patient's chance of recovery."
Professor King explains that the distinction between causation and
valuation justifies treating a lost chance as a compensable injury. "Causation
refers to the cause and effect relationship that must be established between
tortious conduct and a loss before liability for that loss may be imposed...
• Valuation is the process of identifying and measuring the loss that was
caused by the tortious conduct."' Thus, "[w]hat caused a loss, however,
should be a separate question from what the nature and extent of the loss
are."" 3 When a negligent physician causes injury by reducing a patient's
chance of survival, the percentage reduction is the value of that loss. Professor
King points out that this theory is in keeping with the "thin skull" doctrine that
a defendant takes his victim as he finds him. " He criticizes as arbitrary,
unjust, and unfair the all-or-nothing approach, which compensates victims only
when they lose a greater than fifty percent chance of survival. He claims that
the rule "subverts the deterrence objectives of tort law by denying recovery
for the effects of conduct that causes statistically demonstrable losses." 5 In
addition, the rule is unfair because "[b]ut for the defendant's tortious conduct,
it would not have been necessary to grapple with the imponderables of
chance."' 6 Several courts have adopted King's analysis, which is often
referred to as the "pure lost chance" approach.'
Another version of the proportional approach, often referred to as the
substantial possibility or substantial factor approach, relaxes the standard of
causation and allows a case to reach the jury if the plaintiff can establish a
substantial possibility that the defendant's negligence caused his or her
injury.'" The jury must then find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant's negligence caused the substantial loss, which need not be greater
10. King, supra note 7, at 1354.
11. Id. at 1395. Note that as compared with the traditional more-probable-than-not approach,
the definition of injury has changed, but the standard of causation (more likely than not) remains
the same.
12. Id. at 1353-54.
13. Id. at 1363.
14. Id. at 1361.
15. Id. at 1377.
16. Id. at 1378.
17. DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986); Wollen v. DePaul Health
Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 683-85 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d
589, 591 (Nev. 1991).
18. See Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 185-86 (Kan. 1994); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d
398, 402 (N.J. 1990); McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 475 (Okla. 1987).
Note that in contrast to Professor King's pure lost chance approach, the substantial possibility
approach defines the injury as the patient's death, not the lost chance of survival.
1996]
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than fifty percent. Courts often cite the following language of Hicks v. United
States 9 as providing a basis for this approach:
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively
terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant's
mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put
beyond the possibility of realization. If there was any substantial possibility
of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable.2"
Courts also often rely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter
Restatement) section 323 which implies causation based on breach of the
specified duty. The section reads as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking.2
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania endorsed the use of section 323 in
Hamil v. Bashline.' The court held that the section operates "to relax the
degree of certitude normally required of plaintiff's evidence in order to make
a case for the jury as to whether a defendant may be held liable for the
plaintiffs injuries."' When Mr. Hamil began suffering severe chest pains,
his wife took him to the hospital emergency room. The hospital's EKG
machine failed to operate because of a faulty electrical outlet, and a second
machine could not be found. When the hospital staff offered no further aid or
treatment, Mrs. Hamil took her husband to another doctor's office where he
19. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
20. Id. at 632. In Hicks, a Naval doctor negligently misdiagnosed an intestinal obstruction,
which led to the patient's death. However, "[s]ince the uncontradicted testimony was that with
prompt surgery she would have survived," id. at 633, the previously quoted language is only
dicta. Nevertheless, numerous courts have cited Hicks as standing for the proposition that the
causation standard should be relaxed in lost chance cases. See Daniels v. Hadley Mem'l Hosp.,
566 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir. 1970);
James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 585 (N.D. Cal. 1980); McKellips v. St. Francis
Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 472 (Okla. 1987).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
22. 392 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 1978).
23. Id. at 1286.
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died.' 4 Plaintiff complained that the hospital "failed to employ recognized and
available methods of treating decedent's malady. "'
The court explained why such a case should reach the jury:
Section 323(a) recognizes that a particular class of tort actions . . .
differs from those cases normally sounding in tort. Whereas typically a
plaintiff alleges that a defendant's act or omission set in motion a force
which resulted in harm, the theory of the present case is that the defen-
dant's act or omission failed in a duty to protect against harm from another
source. . . . [A] fact-finder must consider not only what did occur, but
also what might have occurred ......
The court acknowledged that deciding cases in this manner fails to require
"the degree of certainty one would prefer and upon which the law normally
insists before a person may be held liable."27 In spite of this, the court
believed the relaxed standard was necessary:
[I]n order that an actor is not completely insulated because of uncertainties
as to the consequences of his negligent conduct, Section 323(a) tacitly
acknowledges this difficulty and permits the issue to go to the jury upon
a less than normal threshold of proof. . . . [Thus,] once a plaintiff has
demonstrated that defendant's acts or omissions, in a situation to which
Section 323(a) applies, have increased the risk of harm to another, such
evidence furnishes a basis for the fact-finder to go further and find that
such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor in bringing about the
resultant harm.
28
Two obvious questions arise: What level of increased risk constitutes a
substantial factor, and what should be the extent of a successful plaintiff's
recovery? Many courts have adopted the reasoning in Hicks and Hamil and
have used section 323 to allow the plaintiff's case to reach the jury when the
plaintiff had less than a fifty percent chance of survival.29 Curiously, the
patients in both Hicks and Hamil would have met the higher traditional
24. Id. at 1283.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1286-87.
27. Id. at 1287.
28. Id. at 1287-88 (footnotes omitted). Because the plaintiff's expert testimony established
that Mr. Hamil's chance of survival would have been approximately seventy-five percent with
proper treatment, the plaintiffs case would have reached the jury under the traditional standard
as well. Id. at 1283.
29. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474,476 (Wash.
1983) (en banc) (holding that a reduction in the chance of survival from thirty-nine percent to
twenty-five percent constituted sufficient evidence of causation to reach the jury).
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standard because their chances of survival prior to the physicians' negligent
conduct exceeded fifty percent. Further, it appears the courts did not reduce
their damages to reflect the possibility that the harm might have been suffered
even if the physician had not been negligent. In contrast, courts using the
substantial factor analysis coupled with a proportional approach explicitly
require that damages be reduced so as to reflect only the percentage chance
lost.3 °
For example, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma relied on both section 323
and Hamil to adopt a substantial factor type of analysis." The court held that
for a case to reach the jury, the plaintiff must show a "substantial decrease in
the chance of survival. "32 To find the defendant liable, the jury must find that
"the increase in risk under the circumstances was more likely than not a
substantial factor in causing the harm.""' In McKellips the emergency room
physician negligently diagnosed the patient's condition as gastritis. Upon his
release, the patient suffered a heart attack and died. Expert testimony
established that with proper diagnosis the patient's chances would have been
"significantly improved. "3 Under the substantial factor rule, the court
determined this evidence was sufficient for plaintiffs case to reach the jury.
35
Underlying the court's decision was its belief that
the health care professional should not be allowed to come in after the fact
and allege that the result was inevitable inasmuch as that person put the
patient's chance beyond the possibility of realization. Health care providers
should not be given the benefit of the uncertainty created by their own
negligent conduct.36
The court did not want to allow physicians "to evade liability for their
negligent actions or inactions" 37 simply because the patient had a less than
even chance of recovering.
Although it may appear that the pure lost chance theory differs materially
from the substantial factor approach, the differences are largely semantic.
Whether the court lowers the standard of causation or redefines the injury as
a lost chance, the result is the same in that a plaintiff receives compensation
30. Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1995); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398 (N.J.
1990); McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987).
31. McKellips, 741 P.2d at 472-474. The court refers to its approach as the section 323
approach.
32. Id. at 475.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 470.
35. Id. at 475.
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despite the greater probability that he or she would have suffered the injury
even if the physician had used due care. Crucially, however, the amount of
damages the plaintiff is allowed to recover accounts for the possibility of harm
absent negligence.
b. Relaxed Causation Approach8
Similar to the substantial factor version of the proportional approach, the
relaxed causation approach allows a plaintiff's case to reach the jury by
relaxing the burden of proof. A plaintiff need only show that the physician's
negligence led to a percentage increase, no matter how small, in the patient's
risk of harm.39 In contrast to the proportional approach, however, the
plaintiff recovers full damages.4" Courts following this approach often rely
on much of the same authority as those applying the proportional substantial
factor approach, including section 323 and the leading cases of Hamil and
Hicks.4 The problem with identifying courts that follow this approach is that
few discuss explicitly that full, as opposed to proportional, damages will be
awarded.42 Currently five states appear to follow this approach.4 3
The Arizona Supreme Court adopted the relaxed causation approach in
Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital, Inc." The Thompson court held
that "[i]f the jury finds that defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care
increased the risk of the harm he undertook to prevent, it may from this fact
find a 'probability' that defendant's negligence was the cause of the dam-
age."4" A thirteen-year-old boy suffered a torn femoral artery in his left
thigh. The emergency room physician who initially examined him determined
that he needed surgery but was "medically transferable." During transport, the
boy's condition worsened. He eventually stabilized, but surgery to repair the
artery was not entirely successful and resulted in residual impairment of the
38. Courts most often refer to this as the increased-risk-of-harm approach.
39. See Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288-89 (Pa. 1978).
40. See Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 187 (Kan. 1994).
41. Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc).
42. The lack of any discussion of damages means, at the very least, that the lower courts are
not bound to discount the damages, and a reasonable inference would be that the deciding court
does not intend for them to do so. Although not explicit, some courts will provide a breakdown
of the damages calculation, which allows the reader to determine that full damages were awarded.
See Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 508 N.E.2d 426, 432-33 (I11. App.
Ct. 1987); Tabor v. Doctors Mem'l Hosp., 563 So. 2d 233, 241 (La. 1990).
43. See Appendix A for state by state breakdown. Note that of the states in the unclear
category of Appendix A.
44. 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984).
45. Id. at 616.
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boy's leg.46 The patient's mother alleged that the doctors were negligent in
deciding to transfer her son to the county hospital for financial reasons.47
The court held that the plaintiff need only present evidence that the
defendant increased the risk of harm to the patient for the case to reach the
jury.48 Once the initial burden is met, then, "[i]f the jury finds that defen-
dant's failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of the harm he
undertook to prevent, it may from this fact find a 'probability' that defendant's
negligence was the cause of the damage. "' The court based its decision on
section 323, which "leaves to the jury, and not the medical expert, the task of
balancing probabilities.... "50 The court further explained that the traditional
rule "puts a premium on each party's search for the willing witness ....
[F]or every expert witness who evaluates the lost chance at 49% there is
another who estimates it at closer to 51 %.,, Finally, the court noted that the
traditional approach "tends to defeat one of the primary functions of the tort
system--deterrence of negligent conduct."52 The court did not require
proportional damages, although it acknowledged that "juries often discount
damages according to the statistical evidence in order to accurately evaluate
the true loss.""
Courts and commentators have criticized this approach for allowing the
plaintiff to recover all her damages even though the injury very likely would
have occurred with proper diagnosis and treatment.5 4 Many courts also
believe that section 323 bears on a defendant's duty and "does not determine
or suggest the appropriate standard of causation. "5
c. Traditional Approach: All-or-Nothing
The traditional approach declines to compensate plaintiffs for a lost
chance unless that chance is greater than fifty percent. If it is, the plaintiff can
recover all of the damages suffered. As one commentator phrased it, "a patient
46. Id. at 607-08.
47. Id. at 608.
48. Id. at 616.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 615 (quoting Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 616.
54. See Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465-66 (D. Kan. 1989).
55. See Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 405 (rex. 1993); Curry v.
Summer, 483 N.E.2d 711, 717 (III, App. Ct. 1985); Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754, 758
(Wis. 1990) ("Section 323(a) is generally viewed as relating only to the duty element .... [It]
does not... lessen a plaintiff's burden of production on the issue of causation."); Beth Clemens
Boggs, Lost Chance of Survival Doctrine: Should the Courts Ever Tinker with Chance?, 16 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 421, 436 (1992); Lisa Perrochet et al., Lost Chance Recovery and the Folly of
Expanding Medical Malpractice Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 615, 617 (1992).
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who probably would have suffered the same harm had he or she received the
proper treatment is entitled to no compensation." 56 Eighteen states currently
follow this approach."
The Ohio Supreme Court applied the traditional standard in Cooper v.
Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc. 8
[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence indicates that a failure to diagnose the
injury prevented the patient from an opportunity to be operated on, which
failure eliminated any chance of the patient's survival, the issue of
proximate cause can be submitted to a jury only if there is sufficient
evidence showing that with proper diagnosis, treatment and surgery the
patient probably would have survived. 9
Cooper involved a sixteen-year-old boy who was hit by a truck while riding
his bike. The defendant physician allegedly conducted an inadequate
examination and failed to discover that the patient had suffered a basal skull
fracture from which he soon died.' The plaintiff's expert testimony indicated
that with proper diagnosis and surgery, the decedent's chance of survival
would have been approximately fifty percent.61 The court explained that the
proportional approach "derogate[s] well-established and valuable proximate
cause considerations."62 A rule that compensates "for the loss of any chance
for survival, regardless of its remoteness .... would be so loose that it would
produce more injustice than justice. "63
Policy reasons given by various courts and commentators supporting this
standard include achieving just results,' measuring physicians by the same
standard as other professionals,' and containing health care costs.' In
56. Perrochet, supra note 55, at 615.
57. See Appendix A for state by state breakdown.
58. 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971).
59. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 99.
61. Id. at 101.
62. Id. at 103.
63. Id.
64. See Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 212-13 (Md. 1990)
(examining the statistical probabilities of reaching a "just" result with proportional recovery under
the lost chance doctrine and concluding that the traditional standard results in fewer mistakes).
65. "No other professional malpractice defendant carries this burden of liability without the
requirement that plaintiffs prove the alleged negligence probably rather than possibly caused the
injury." Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (Fla. 1984); Falcon
v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 65 (Mich. 1990); Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594,
603 (Tenn. 1993).
66. See Fennell, 580 A.2d at 215 (predicting that "[riecognition of this new form of medical
malpractice damages for loss of a chance would undoubtedly cause an increase in medical
malpractice litigation, as well as result in an increase in medical malpractice insurance costs");
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addition, some courts believe that the legislature is better suited to make such
comprehensive changes.67
C. JONES V. OWINGS68
Alice Jones fractured her left femur in October 1987. She consulted Dr.
Ralph Owings, an orthopedic surgeon, for treatment of the injury. In
connection with this treatment, a radiologist took a preoperative chest x-ray
of Ms. Jones on October 27. In his report the radiologist noted an abnormality
in Ms. Jones's left upper lung and recommended follow-up x-rays or a CT
scan. When Ms. Jones returned a year later to have pins removed from her
hip, the radiologist performed a second chest x-ray. His report noted
"probable scarring left upper lobe," and he again recommended a CT scan.
Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Owings took no action in response to these reports.
In September 1989, Ms. Jones was diagnosed with lung cancer, from which
she died on June 18, 1990. Plaintiff's expert testified that Ms. Jones's chance
of survival at the time of the first x-ray would have been approximately fifty
percent.69 By the second x-ray, her chance had diminished to between twenty
and twenty-five percent. When the cancer was finally diagnosed, she had only
a fifteen to twenty percent chance of survival.7"
Ms. Jones's husband brought a wrongful death suit against Dr. Owings
alleging that Dr. Owings performed negligently in failing to inform Ms. Jones
of the radiologist's reports, in failing to follow up on the radiologist's
recommendations, and in failing to diagnose Ms. Jones's lung cancer. Dr.
Owings moved for summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause arguing
that the plaintiffs expert testimony failed to show that his negligence more
probably than not caused Ms. Jones's death (i.e., her chance of survival at the
time of the first x-ray was not greater than fifty percent). The trial court
agreed and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment." The
plaintiff appealed this ruling arguing that the trial court erred in defining
see also Perrochet, supra note 55, at 628 (concluding that the lost chance doctrine is "contrary
to sound public policy because [it would] adversely impact the cost and quality of health care and
exacerbate the problems of defensive medicine and cost containment").
67. Dumas v. Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that
"[s]weeping modifications of tort liability law fall more suitably within the domain of the
Legislature, before which all affected interests can be heard and which can enact statutes
providing uniform standards and guidelines for the future" (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443
P.2d 561, 569 (Cal. 1968) (Burke, J., dissenting))).
68. _ S.C. _, 456 S.E.2d 371 (1995).
69. Id. at , 456 S.E.2d at 372.
70. Id. at , 456 S.E.2d at 372.
71. Id. at , 456 S.E.2d at 372.
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decedent's disease and death, rather than her lost chance, as the injury.72 In
an opinion written by Justice Toal, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed
with the trial court's rejection of the lost chance doctrine and affirmed the
summary judgment, thus denying the plaintiff any recovery."
The court began its analysis by reaffirming the traditional standard of
causation in a medical malpractice action (i.e., that "the defendant's
negligence most probably resulted in the injuries alleged" 4). For this
proposition, the court relied primarily on Sherer v. James, 5 an earlier South
Carolina Supreme Court medical malpractice case involving negligent
misdiagnosis.
In Sherer the court noted that the South Carolina Court of Appeals had
endorsed the "increased risk of harm" theory in Clark v. Ross,76 in which a
jury charge of Restatement section 32317 (nearly verbatim) was given for the
standard of proof in a medical malpractice case. Neither party appealed Clark,
and thus, Sherer marked the first opportunity for the South Carolina Supreme
Court to address the propriety of such a charge.7" The Sherer court rejected
the increased risk of harm approach by interpreting section 323 as only
defining the defendant's duty of care and not relating to causation:
Section 323(a) simply establishes a duty on one who undertakes to render
services for the protection of another to use due care to avoid increasing
the risk of harm.... [E]ven if Section 323(a) could be construed as
relating to proximate cause, we are unwilling to relax the plaintiffs burden
of proof in a medical malpractice case. A defendant physician is entitled
to put the medical malpractice plaintiff to proof equally as stringent as that
required of plaintiffs in other negligence actions.
79
The Jones court then examined how other courts have handled the lost
chance doctrine. The court recognized three basic approaches: (1) the
traditional approach ("more probably than not" standard) (2) the relaxed
72. Id. at __,456 S.E.2d at 373.
73. Id. at __, 456 S.E.2d at 374.
74. Id. at __,456 S.E.2d at 372 (citing Sherer v. James, 290 S.C. 404, 407, 351 S.E.2d
148, 150 (1986)).
75. 290 S.C. 404, 351 S.E.2d 148 (1986).
76. 284 S.C. 543, 328 S.E.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1985), cited in Sherer, 290 S.C. at 406 n.2, 351
S.E.2d 150 n.2.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
78. Sherer, 290 S.C. at 406 n.2, 351 S.E.2d at 150 n.2.
79. Id. at 407-08, 351 S.E.2d at 150-151 (citation omitted) (quoting Curry v. Summer, 483
N.E.2d 711, 717 (II1. App. Ct. 1985)).
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causation approach,'0 and (3) the proportional approach."1 In footnotes the
court defined and cited cases approving of the latter two approaches. s2
Finally, the court focused on the traditional approach that declines to
compensate plaintiffs for a lost chance unless that chance is greater than fifty
percent.8 3 The court quoted the Ohio Supreme Court in its rejection of the
loss of chance doctrine: "Lesser standards of proof are understandably
attractive in malpractice cases where physical well being, and life itself, are
the subject of litigation . . . . However we have trepidations that such a rule
would be so loose that it would produce more injustice than justice. "I Justice
Toal concluded with the following remarks:
We are persuaded that the "the loss of chance doctrine is fundamentally at
odds with the requisite degree of medical certitude necessary to establish
a causal link between the injury of a patient and the tortious conduct of a
physician." Legal responsibility in this approach is in reality assigned
based on the mere possibility that a tortfeasor's negligence was a cause of
the ultimate harm. This formula is contrary to the most basic standards of
proof which undergird the tort system. s5
The South Carolina Supreme Court relied on South Carolina precedent
that appears directly on point with the issues in Jones, as well as traditional
standards of causation, to provide a consistent treatment of lost chance cases
in South Carolina. However, a more detailed analysis of the approaches the
court chose to reject would have provided valuable insight into the court's
position.
The court's reliance on Sherer, which explains at some length its rejection
of the relaxed causation theory, may have obviated the need for the court to
rehash this issue. Many courts and commentators have agreed that section 323
pertains to duty and not to causation.8 6 In addition, awarding full damages
when the patient's chance of survival falls below fifty percent strikes many as
80. Many courts and commentators refer to this approach as the increased risk of harm
approach.
81. Jones, _ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 373.
82. Id. at__ nn. 1-2, 456 S.E.2d at 373 nn. 1-2. The court mistakenly categorized McKellips
v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987) as one of five states endorsing the relaxed
causation approach that allows the plaintiff to recover full damages. The court in McKellips
clearly required proportional damages. McKellips, 741 P.2d at 476; see also supra notes 8, 18,
20, 31-36 and accompanying text.
83. Jones, _ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 373.
84. Id. at, 456 S.E.2d at 373 (quoting Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc.,
272 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ohio 1971)).
85. Id. at-, 456 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn.
1993) (citation omitted)).
86. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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unreasonable. As one court explained, "[tihis approach is too onerous for
defendants. They should not have to compensate a plaintiff for the percentage
of the harm that they did not cause or that would have occurred naturally. "'7
However, the reasons behind the court's rejection of the proportional view
of the lost chance doctrine are less clear. The court seemed to rely primarily
on the idea that the lost chance doctrine is at odds with traditional tort law
principles.88 This explanation is not helpful because many new doctrines
develop that appear inconsistent with traditional tort law but which the South
Carolina Supreme Court nevertheless has adopted because the doctrines serve
some underlying goals of tort law. For example, the court adopted the doctrine
of comparative fault in all negligence actions in 1991.9 What is
missing from the court's analysis is reference to a set of first principles that
would help explain why the court chose to deny recovery to a class of
plaintiffs who have been harmed by another's negligence. In the footnote
explaining the lost chance doctrine, the court recited Professor King's thesis
but failed to address with specificity the fundamental tort principles upon
which the doctrine is founded.' The court surely had some notion of what
goals tort law should serve, and which Jones presumably furthers, but the
reader is left to wonder what these goals are. For example, Professor King's
theory is founded on goals of loss-spreading, compensating victims, and
deterrence. Other courts rejecting King's theory have attempted to address
these goals or espouse goals of their own. One court responded to King's
deterrence argument as follows:
[W]e reject the notion that the enhanced deterrence of the loss of chance
approach might be so valuable as to justify scrapping our traditional
concepts of causation. If deterrence were the sole value to be served by
tort law, we could dispense with the notion of causation altogether and
award damages on the basis of negligence alone.9
87. Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Kan. 1989).
88. See Jones, __ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 374.
89. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).
90. Justice Toal's description of Professor King's thesis is as follows:
mhe loss of a chance of achieving a favorable outcome or of avoiding an adverse
consequence should be compensable and should be valued appropriately, rather than
treated as an all-or-nothing proposition. Preexisting conditions must, of course, be
taken into account in valuing the interest destroyed. When those preexisting
conditions have not absolutely preordained an adverse outcome, however, the chance
of avoiding it should be appropriately compensated even if that chance is not better
than even.
Jones, _ S.C. at _ n.2, 456 S.E.2d at 373 n.2 (quoting King, supra note 7, at 1354).
91. Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 406 (Tex. 1993); see also
Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 603 (Tenn. 1993) ("Rather than deterring undesirable
conduct, the [lost chance doctrine] only penalizes the medical profession for inevitable
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Although this point may be incorrect,' the court at least attempted to explain
why it found the lost chance doctrine to fall short.
Many courts and commentators also espouse the goal of containing health
care costs.93 However, if courts apply the proportional approach to all lost
chance cases (those with a greater than even chance of survival as well as
those under fifty percent), then there should be no net increase in the total
amount of damages awarded in medical malpractice actions.94 As one court
noted, this "serves an important societal interest in the context of medical-
malpractice litigation. A rule of law that more precisely confines physicians'
liability for negligence to the value of the interest damaged should have a
salutary effect on the cost and availability of medical care. " '
Some courts voice concerns that the doctrine would extend to other
professionals,96 perhaps with good reason, considering the Seventh Circuit
recently recommended the application of the proportional approach to
employment discrimination cases.' A major problem with extending the
doctrine to other fields is the greater difficulty in ascertaining the percentage
chance lost. This should concern courts desiring to apply the doctrine to these
other fields but should not keep them from adopting the doctrine in medical
malpractice cases in which experts can accurately calculate such percentages.
Many courts address some of these concerns by limiting the scope of the
proportional approach. Methods used to confine the lost chance doctrine
include limiting recovery to cases of serious injury or death98 and requiring
that the percentage chance lost be significant or substantial. 99 For example,
unfavorable results." (quoting Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 68 (Mich. 1990))).
92. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 236 (1987).
93. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
94. See Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 406 (N.J. 1990) (holding jury should have been
instructed to reduce its award of damages to reflect the percentage chance lost, "even though
plaintiffs' proofs may have satisfied traditional standards of proximate causation").
95. Id. at 408.
96. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805
P.2d 589, 599 n.3 (Nev. 1991) (Steffen, J., dissenting) (arguing:
if the majority's loss of chance doctrine is just in the context of a medical malpractice
action, it would be equally just and applicable in such actions involving other
professions, including the legal profession. For example, if a disgruntled or
unsuccessful litigant loses a case, and it could be shown through expert testimony that
there was a forty percent chance of winning the case, but the lawyer's negligent
efforts reduced the chance of winning by some degree, the litigant would be able to
pursue an action based upon the loss of chance doctrine);
Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 406 (Tex. 1993) (claiming "it is doubtful
there is any principled way we could prevent its application to similar actions involving other
professions" (footnote omitted)).
97. Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1207 (7th Cir. 1996).
98. Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991).
99. Id. at 592; see also Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56 (Mich. 1990)
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the Nevada Supreme Court endorsed the use of both these methods by
requiring that the lost chance be substantial and that the patient suffer "death
or debilitating injury." " Although the court declined to define "substan-
tial," it emphasized that limits did exist and offered that the loss of a ten
percent chance probably would not qualify.''
D. CONCLUSION
In Jones the South Carolina Supreme Court definitively rejected the lost
chance doctrine.
3 in medical malpractice cases. Whether this decision will be challenged by the
South Carolina legislature remains an open question. While eighteen other
states have found the traditional approach persuasive, the majority status that
the court conferred upon it may not be justified, as twenty-three states have
chosen an alternative approach."° Although there is room for debate as to
which approach better serves the goals of the tort system, the proportional
approach probably deserves more consideration than the court afforded it.
Bryson B. Moore*
(finding thirty-seven and one-half chance of survival substantial but not deciding what lesser
chances would qualify); Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 685 n.3 (Mo. 1992)
(en banc) (limiting recovery "to those cases in which the chance ... lost was sizeable enough
to be material .... [and when statistical evidence is used], the lost chance must be statistically
significant within applicable statistical standards").
100. Perez, 805 P.2d at 592. The court explained that "the plaintiff or injured person cannot
recover merely on the basis of a decreased chance of survival or of avoiding a debilitating illness
or injury; the plaintiff must in fact suffer death or debilitating injury before there can be an award
of damages." Id.
101. Id. Admittedly, the substantial/significant requirement interjects some uncertainty into
the process as the definition of these terms could vary from court to court. However, one way
to avoid this uncertainty would be for the court to specify a range of percentages, for example
twenty-five to fifty percent, that qualify as substantial.
102. The twenty-two states in this alternative approach category include the eleven states
following the proportional approach, the five states that have adopted the relaxed causation
approach, and seven states, that while they are in the unclear category, fall into one of the above-
mentioned categories. See Appendix A for a complete state by state breakdown.
* The author would like to extend thanks to Professor John Lopatka for his invaluable advice
and comments in reviewing the substance of this survey.
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1. See Appendix B for representative cases for each state.
2. Proportional Damages. This category includes those states that have adopted either the
substantial factor or pure form of the lost chance doctrine and have required proportional
damages.
3. Relaxed Causation. This category includes those states which do not discount
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4. Traditional. This category includes all states that require that the plaintiff prove that
the defendant's negligence more probably than not caused the patient's injury and allow the
plaintiff to recover full damages.
5. Unclear. This miscellaneous category includes the states that did not clearly fit into the
other categories. Those states marked with an asterix have adopted some version of the lost
chance doctrine, but it is unclear which one (usually because the court has failed to address
whether proportional or full damages are to be awarded or because the court cites cases and
uses terminology from two different approaches). The unmarked states include states where
it is unclear whether the court is adopting the lost chance doctrine at all, the state has only
impliedly or in dicta adopted an approach, or there is division among the appellate courts.
6. Open. This category includes those states where the courts have never addressed the
lost chance doctrine or have decided to leave the question of whether to adopt the doctrine
open.
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Murdoch v. Thomas, 404 So. 2d 580 (Ala.
1981).
Abile v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 703
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (applying Alaska law).
Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp.,
Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984) (en bane).
Blankenship v. Burnett, 803 S.W.2d 539
(Ark. 1991).
Dumas v. Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Simmons v. West
Covina Med. Clinic, 260 Cal. Rptr. 772
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Morgenroth v. Pacific
Med. Ctr., Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976).
Kaiser Found. Health Plan v. Sharp, 741
P.2d 714, 718 n.5 (Colo. 1987) (explaining
consideration of lost chance doctrine is not
necessary to resolve this case and stating
"we express no opinion on whether we
would apply section 323(a) in a proper
case").
Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn.
1990) (adopting proportional approach in an
analogous cause of action, increased risk of
future harm); LaBieniec v. Baker, 526 A.2d
1341, 1345 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (implicit-
ly recognizing that a decreased chance for
successful treatment may be a compensable
injury in itself by stating that "a plaintiff
must show (1) that he has in fact been
deprived of a chance for successful
treatment and (2) that the decreased chance
for successful treatment more likely than not
resulted from the defendant's negligence";
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chance of recovery had decreased at all;
relying however, on cases supporting the
traditional approach, so it is not clear
whether the court misread the cited cases
and would explicitly adopt the proportional
approach in an appropriate case or whether
the court is misstating the traditional
approach and would choose to follow it).
But see Grody v. Tulin, 365 A.2d 1076
(Conn. 1976) (applying traditional approach
to lost chance case).
United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d
1098 (Del. 1994) (holding lost chance
doctrine not viable in actions brought under
Delaware's wrongful death statute but
leaving open whether doctrine would apply
in a personal injury action brought by a
victim or in a survival action brought by a
victim's personal representative); Shively v.
Klein, 551 A.2d 41 (Del. 1988) (affirming
trial court's refusal to instruct jury on lost
chance doctrine because plaintiffs did not
plead that theory but not ruling out
possibility of applying the doctrine in an
appropriate case).
Daniels v. Hadley Mem'l Hosp., 566 F.2d
749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the
plaintiff need only show that the defendant's
negligence was a "substantial factor" in
causing the plaintiffs injury but leaving the
question of damages to be determined on
remand); see also Snead v. United States,
595 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C. 1984) (court
must look at patient's chances of survival
and extent defendant interfered with those
chances).
Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc.,
445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).
Richmond County Hosp. Auth. Operating
Univ. Hosp. v. Dickerson, 356 S.E.2d 548
[Vol.48
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(Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that probable
cause is not eliminated by merely establish-
ing that the patient has less than a fifty
percent chance of survival but failing to
address whether proportional or full damag-
es should be awarded).
Hawaii McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72, 75
(9th Cir. 1972) (applying Hawaii law)
(holding that plaintiff established "the
requisite reasonable medical probability"
with expert testimony that absent the
physician's negligence, the patient's chance
of survival would have improved at least
fifty percent and stating that "the absence of
positive certainty should not bar recovery if
negligent failure to provide treatment
deprives a patient of a significant
improvement in his chances for recovery";
failing to address whether proportional or
full damages should be awarded).
Idaho Hilden v. Ball, 787 P.2d 1122, 1126 (Idaho
1989) ("adopting" traditional approach in
dicta as issue not preserved for appeal;
noting in concurring opinion that court is not
rejecting lost chance doctrine as it may
apply in an appropriate case).
Illinois Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss
Mem'l Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (relying on section 323 to hold
that "evidence which shows to a reasonable
degree of certainty that negligent delay in
diagnosis or treatment lessened the effective-
ness of treatment . . . is sufficient to estab-
lish proximate cause"; failing to discuss,
however, whether proportional or full dam-
ages should be awarded (quoting James v.
United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 585 (N.D.
Cal. 1980))); see also Chambers v. Rush-
Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 508
N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). But see
Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d 301
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(Ill. 1975) (not specifically addressing the
lost chance doctrine but holding plaintiff
must show that physician's negligence more
probably than not caused the injury); Hare
v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d
778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Russell v.
Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986); Curry v. Summer, 483 N.E.2d 711
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
Indiana Mayhue v. Sparkman, 627 N.E.2d 1354
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Watson v. Medical
Emergency Servs. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1191
(Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
Iowa DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131
(Iowa 1986).
Kansas Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149
(Kan. 1984) (adopting proportional approach
for lost chance of survival); Delaney v.
Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994) (certified
question) (expanding Roberson to allow
recovery for lost chance of recovery).
Kentucky Walden v. Jones, 439 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1968).
Louisiana Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498
So. 2d 713 (La. 1986); see also Tabor v.
Doctors Mem'l Hosp., 563 So. 2d 233 (La.
1990) (defendant's conduct need not be only
cause of harm, merely the substantial fac-
tor); Smith v. State, 523 So. 2d 815 (La.
1988) (lost chance recognized but evidence
only indicated possible determination and
not whether earlier treatment would have
increased chances).
Maine Phillips v. East Maine Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d
306 (Me. 1989) (leaving question open
whether court would adopt lost chance
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Maryland Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc.,
580 A.2d 206 (Md. 1990).
Massachusetts Wright v. Clement, 190 N.E. 11 (Mass.
1934); Coughlin v. Bixon, 504 N.E.2d 1069
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987); Glicklich v.
Spievack, 452 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. App. Ct.
1983).
Michigan Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44
(Mich. 1990).
Minnesota Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 641
n.4 (Minn. 1980) (leaving question open by
"adopting" traditional approach but then
qualifying this by saying, "[w]e have not
heretofore adopted the rule in Hamil and, in
view of evidentiary differences between
Hamil and the present case, we need not
accept or reject the rule here").
Mississippi Clayton v. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439
(Miss. 1985).
Missouri Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d
681 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (adopting propor-
tional approach but requiring chance of
recovery lost be sizable enough to be
material).
Montana Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 828
(Mont. 1985) (appearing to adopt propor-
tional approach as court quoted extensively
from Professor King's discussion of propor-
tional damages before specifically approving
of lost chance doctrine).
Nebraska Pierce v. Shera, No. A-92-716, 1994 WL
72133 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1994).
Nevada Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d
589 (Nev. 1991) (adopting lost chance
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Pillsbury-Flood v. Portsmouth Hosp., 512
A.2d 1126 (N.H. 1986).
Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398 (N.J. 1990).
Alfonso v. Lund, 783 F.2d 958 (10th Cir.
1986) (applying New Mexico law).
Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357
N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1974), af'd, 337
N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that a
question of fact was established when
evidence showed patient would have had a
twenty to forty percent chance of survival
absent the physician's negligence but failing
to discuss whether proportional or full
damages should be awarded); Mortensen v.
Memorial Hosp., 483 N.Y.S.2d 264, 269
(App. Div. 1984) (holding that Kallenberg
does not mean that a plaintiff may recover
for any lost chance of survival, but that
there must be a "substantial possibility" that
absent physician's negligence the plaintiff
would have recovered; failing to address
damages question); see also Hoffson v.
Orentreich, 543 N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div.
1989), modified, 562 N.Y.S.2d 479 (App.
Div. 1990).
Shumaker v. United States, 714 F. Supp.
154, 164 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (stating that "the
court cannot say at this time that the current
status of the law is such that the North
Carolina Supreme Court would reject the
[lost chance] theory" and holding that the
plaintiff may pursue lost chance of recovery
theory but declining to address at that time
what type of damages may be recovered).
But see Morrison v. Stallworth, 326 S.E.2d
387, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
plaintiff can recover for shortened life
expectancy and stating that general rule is
that damages "must be shown to be
[Vol.48
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probable, not merely possible, consequences
of the injury").
VanVleet v. Pfeifle, 289 N.W.2d 781, 785
(N.D. 1980) (holding a question of fact as to
causation was established when evidence
indicated that absent the doctor's negligence
the plaintiff possibly could have been cured
("a significantly better" than five percent
chance) or probably would have lived
longer; failing to discuss whether
proportional or full damages should be
awarded).
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati,
Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971).
McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., 741 P.2d
467 (Okla. 1987).
No cases found addressing the lost chance
doctrine. But see Horn v. National Hosp.
Ass'n, 131 P.2d 455 (Or. 1942) (affirming
traditional standard of causation in medical
malpractice cases in general).
Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa.
1978); Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 431 A.2d
920 (Pa. 1981).
Schenck v. Roger Williams Gen. Hosp., 382
A.2d 514 (R.I. 1977).
Jones v. Owings, __
371 (1995).
S.C. ,456 S.E.2d
Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 94 (8th Cir.
1977) (applying South Dakota law) (holding
that proximate cause is established when
plaintiff shows "by a preponderance of the
evidence that [the defendant's] negligence
operated substantially to reduce the chances"
of the plaintiff's recovery but failing to
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address whether proportional or full
damages should be awarded).
Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594
(Tenn. 1993).
Kramer v. Lewisvile Mem'l Hosp., 858
S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1993).
George v. LDS Hosp., 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
Short v. United States, 908 F. Supp. 227
(D. Vt. 1995) (applying Vermont law)
(finding Vermont would adopt the
proportional approach in a negligent failure
to diagnose case).
Blondel v. Hays, 403 S.E.2d 340 (Va.
1991).
Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget
Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (en
banc).
Thornton v. CAMC, Etc., 305 S.E.2d 316
(W. Va. 1983); see also Catlett v.
McQueen, 375 S.E.2d 184 (W. Va. 1988)
(defendant's acts must be substantial factor
in increasing risk of harm to plaintiff).
Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754 (Wis.
1990).
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Ill. COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY ARE SEPARATE AND
INDEPENDENT CAUSES IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION
In Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc.' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a products liability cause of action may lie in negligence even when the
defendant is not liable under a strict liability theory. The court went on to set
out the distinctions between the two causes of action2 and discussed the tests
for defectiveness that have evolved under South Carolina law. Additionally,
the court held that there is no post-sale duty to warn of defects and reaffirmed
the viability of the sophisticated user defense.
James Robert Bragg3 and his partner, Scott Rogers, were using an aerial
bucket truck, manufactured by defendant Hi-Ranger, Inc., to perform a pole
change-out procedure on energized power lines.4 Bragg, aloft in the bucket,
was using a hydraulic impact wrench fed by two hoses that ran from the truck
up through the boom to the bucket. According to Rogers, there was a "pop or
something," and then Bragg yelled down for him to turn the truck off. The
aerial bucket caught fire, and Bragg jumped out of it to escape the flames.
Several days later he died of his injuries.5
Accident investigation revealed that the fire began when one of the
hydraulic hoses contacted more than one energized power line. The aerial
bucket was designed to be used with detachable hydraulic hoses made of
material that would not conduct electricity and that would, therefore, prevent
this type of accident. However, a short time before Bragg's accident, a
mechanic had replaced the correct, non-conductive hydraulic hose with a
conductive hose.6
Bragg's case proceeded sued on theories of defective design and failure
to warn based on negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty.' Hi-Ranger
pleaded a general denial and asserted affirmative defenses of "(1) contributory
negligence, (2) assumption of the risk, (3) intervening negligence, (4)
substantial change in condition of the product after its sale, (5) open and
1. _ S.C. , 462 S.E.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1995).
2. Negligence focuses on the conduct of the defendant while strict liability is concerned with
the defectiveness of the product. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
3. This action was brought by Betty Bragg, the personal representative of James Robert
Bragg. Bragg, _ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 323.
4. Id. at _,462 S.E.2d at 323-24.
5. Id. at _,462 S.E.2d at 324.
6. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 324.
7. Id. at _,462 S.E.2d at 323.
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obvious danger, and (6) misuse of the product pursuant to South Carolina
Code Ann. [section] 15-73-20."'
At trial Bragg presented expert testimony to prove that the aerial device
was defective in both design and warnings. The first expert maintained that the
failure to design the hose coupling in a manner that would have prevented
conductive hoses from being attached rendered the aerial bucket defective.9
Bragg's second expert testified that the aerial bucket was defective because it
did not have an adequate warning of the risk of using conductive hydraulic
hoses.' 0
The trial court partially granted Hi-Ranger's motion for a directed verdict,
dismissing Bragg's claims of strict liability and implied warranty."I The trial
judge made several findings to support his decision to grant the directed
verdict on the strict liability claim:
(1) Bragg failed to introduce any evidence that the aerial device was
defective or unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in the quick
disconnect couplings in 1984 at the time the aerial device was sold;
(2) Bragg failed to present evidence of a feasible design alternative for the
quick disconnect couplings she claimed were defective due to inadequate
design;'2 (3) the aerial device had been substantially changed between the
time of its sale in 1984 and the 1990 accident; (4) the warnings on the
aerial device at the time of the 1990 accident had been removed, painted
over, or replaced and therefore were not substantially in the same condition
as they were at the time the unit was sold in 1984; and (5) Bragg failed to
establish the aerial device proximately caused her decedent's injuries and
death.
13
Concluding that "[t]here is some evidence here which, if believed, could
show some degree of negligence on the part of [Hi-Ranger] proximately
resulting in injury to Mr. Bragg,"' 4 the judge sent the remaining negligence
claim to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Hi-Ranger. Bragg appealed,
8. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 323. For the South Carolina defective products statute, see infra
note 18.
9. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 324.
10. Id. at , 462 S.E.2d at 324.
11. Id. at 462 S.E.2d at 323.
12. The court, in a footnote, remarked on the expert's concession that "his special quick
disconnect couplings were only for demonstration purposes and would not work because, among
other things, they would leak hydraulic fluid." Id. at n.4, 462 S.E.2d at 324 n.4. The court
could not have meant to suggest that plaintiffs have the impossible burden of manufacturing a
fully functional example of their proposed alternative design. It is the design that is to be
evaluated; not the workmanship of demonstrative evidence.
13. Id. at 462 S.E.2d at 325.
14. Id. at , 462 S.E.2d at 325 (alteration in original).
[Vol. 48
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contending inter alia that strict liability and negligence claims require virtually
the same proof and that granting a motion for directed verdict on a strict
liability claim while denying a similar motion on negligence is logically
inconsistent and therefore reversible error.'
Not surprisingly, the court's analysis of the trial judge's ruling focused on
distinguishing negligence from strict liability.' 6 The court first noted that
negligence is concerned with the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, but
under strict liability the focus is on the defectiveness of the product itself.7
Strict liability was adopted in South Carolina by statute in 1974 when the
General Assembly codified Section 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts.' Not only does the statute track, for the most part, the language of
section 402A, but it also incorporates by reference the reporter's comments. 9
The comments indicate that the operative language--"defective condition
15. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 325.
16. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 325-26 (citing John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27
S.C. L. REV. 803, 828-29 (1976)). But see David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding
the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743 (1996) (arguing that courts which
employ the risk-benefit test for strict liability in product design and defective warning cases are
in reality using a negligence analysis and, therefore, should abandon strict liability except in the
instance of manufacturing defect cases).
17. Bragg, - S.C. at __, 462 S.E.2d at 326. See, e.g., Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes,
Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1982).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976). This code section reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
The statute does not explicitly define "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." Courts have
been struggling to find the best test since Section 402A was promulgated in 1964. As of February
1, 1996, ten states explicitly use the "consumer expectations test," and seven use a "risk-benefit"
or "risk-utility analysis." John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law
Institute Adorns a "New Cloth "for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of
the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 551, 951-955 (1996). Four
states do not recognize strict products liability (Delaware, Michigan, North Carolina, and
Virginia). Id. The remaining states use various other tests that combine elements of both the
risk-benefit and consumer-expectations analyses. Id.
For discussion of the South Carolina test, see infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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unreasonably dangerous"--is defined in terms of the expectations of the
ordinary consumer.2"
Interestingly, the Bragg court noted that under "any products liability
theory' '=1 three elements must be proven: "(1) [plaintiff] was injured by the
product; (2) the injury occurred because the product was in a defective
condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user; and (3) that the product at the
time of the accident was in essentially the same condition as when it left the
hands of the defendant."2 These are the basic elements of the strict liability
claim, but, the court reasoned, to recover under negligence the plaintiff must
prove the additional element of the defendant's "fail[ure] to exercise due care
in some respect."' On its face this would seem to indicate that if, as Bragg
argued, a plaintiff is able to plead sufficient facts to prove negligence, then he
must have already pled sufficient facts to support a claim for strict liability.
Conversely, because the trial court found that Bragg had failed to prove the
elements of a strict liability claim, it would seem that as a matter of law Hi-
Ranger should have been granted a directed verdict on the negligence claim.
The court recognized this inconsistency and proceeded to examine a
circumstance in which a plaintiff had recovered under negligence but not under
strict liability. In a Minnesota failure-to-warn case, Bigham v. .JC. Penney
Co.,24 the plaintiff sued a clothing retailer for burn injuries aggravated by the
"melt and cling" effect of the polyester and cotton blend in his work clothes."
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that under Minnesota's then extant
"consumer expectations test,"26 the plaintiffs expectation that he would be
exposed to the risk of burns from high voltage was different from the
expectations of the "ordinary consumer." In sum, the plaintiffs profession
subjected him to known fire hazards for which he could not recover under
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965) ("in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him"); Id. cmt.
i ("dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer").
21. Bragg, _ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added). The phrase indicates that
products liability cases can be brought under negligence, warranty, or strict liability theories.
22. Id. at , 462 S.E.2d at 326.
23. Id. at __, 462 S.E.2d at 326.
24. 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978). Coincidentally, the plaintiff in Bigham was also a
lineman and was injured by high voltage.
25. Id. at 895.
26. Minnesota rejected the consumer expectations test in favor of a "reasonable care
balancing test" in Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982). Minnesota later
changed to the "Wade-Keeton test" (which imputes knowledge of the defective condition to the
manufacturer) in Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984), cited in Bragg, _ S.C.
at _, 462 S.E.2d at 326.
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strict liability.' However, the jury's determination that J.C. Penney negligent-
ly failed to warn of the "melt and cling" hazard was upheld.2"
There are some difficulties with applying the unique ruling of Bigham
to the facts in Bragg. First, James Bragg was precisely the "ordinary consumer"
who would foreseeably use a bucket truck. Indeed, the truck was specifically
designed for linemen working on high voltage electrical lines. Second, the
Bigham court's logic only works in a jurisdiction that uses the consumer-
expectations test. It is unclear whether South Carolina has adopted the
consumer-expectations test; the current trend is to rely more on a risk-benefit
analysis.29
In contrast, Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,30 distin-
guished by Bigham, supports the Bragg court's reasoning. The jury in
Halvorson held that the defendant crane manufacturer was negligent even
though the crane was not defective.3' The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed,
calling the result "inconsistent and irreconcilable."32 Because the crane
operator had disregarded an explicit warning, there was no failure-to-warn
issue; thus, the only question for jury consideration was the design-defect issue,
albeit on both strict liability and negligence theories. It was considered possible
for the "questions of negligent design and manufacture [to] be subsumed in a
jury's decision that a product is not defective, [although] failure to warn of
potential hazards from the use of a product is a separate issue."33 In Bragg the
plaintiff presented evidence on both design defect and failure to warn.34 It is
conceivable that the court viewed the failure-to-warn issue as a separate theory
apart from the defectiveness of the product, but there is no language in the case
to support this contention nor to indicate what aspect of Hi-Ranger's conduct
could have been negligent.
The key to understanding Bragg is discerning exactly what test South
Carolina uses for determining if a product is in a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous."35 The court attempted to do this in an extensive
analysis of the historical development and current state of strict products
liability in South Carolina. The court began by explaining that two tests have
evolved to determine defectiveness. "The first test is whether the product is
unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary consumer or user given the conditions
27. Bigham, 268 N.W.2d at 897.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
30. 240 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1976).
31. Id. at 306.
32. Id. at 307.
33. Bigham, 268 N.W.2d at 896 (construing Halvorson, 240 N.W.2d at 308).
34. Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., _ S.C. _, _, 462 S.E.2d 321, 324 (Ct. App. 1995).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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and circumstances that foreseeably attend the use of the product."36 The
difficulty with using this phrase as a "test" is that one still must define
"unreasonably dangerous." In Claytor v. General Motors Corp.,37 the South
Carolina Supreme Court provided the needed definition: "In the final analysis,
we have another of the law's balancing acts[,] and numerous factors must be
considered, including the usefulness and desirability of the product, the cost
involved for added safety, the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury,
and the obviousness of danger."3
This balancing language is conceptually similar to the second test
outlined by the Bragg court: "[A] product is unreasonably dangerous and
defective if the danger associated with the use of the product outweighs the
utility of the product."39 This is a typical formulation of the "risk-benefit"
test, the test that Claytor, the leading South Carolina case, made abundantly
clear is the appropriate mode of analysis.4"
In Bragg, the actual test employed by the court of appeals is something
of a hybrid taken from Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc.4" Reed was decided
shortly after Claytor and has been widely followed. The Reed court synthesized
the balancing approach of Claytor with the consumer expectations test of an
earlier South Carolina decision,42 to formulate a test under which "[t]his
'balancing act' necessarily is relevant to the determination that the product, as
designed, is unreasonably dangerous in its failure to conform to the ordinary
consumer's expectations."43 The result of Claytor and Reed is a line of South
Carolina jurisprudence that fails to distinguish clearly between risk-benefit and
consumer-expectations tests." It seems that the courts are constrained by the
text of the defective products statute to include consumer expectations language
in the test for defectiveness, but are wary of straying too far from reasonable-
ness concerns as a matter of policy.
45
In light of this mixed view of what is meant by "unreasonably
dangerous," recall the court's use of Bigham as authority. It bears reiteration
36. Bragg, _ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 328.
37. 277 S.C. 259, 286 S.E.2d 129 (1982).
38. Id. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
39. Bragg, _ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 328.
40. Cf. F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS
238 (1990) ("Given th[e] common emphasis on 'reasonable' design and warning, it may be that
manufacturing defects are the only true instance of liability without respect to negligence; design
and warning defects, even when phrased in terms of warranty or strict liability, may be simply
a version of negligence liability specially adapted to products liability cases.").
41. 697 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (4th Cir. 1982) (interpreting South Carolina law).
42. Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978).
43. Reed, 697 F.2d at 1197.
44. Cf. Vargo, supra note 18, at 884-88, 952 (classifying South Carolina's test as a
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that Bigham's logic is undercut in a jurisdiction-like South Carolina-that
recognizes a risk-utility analysis, even if only to a limited degree.16 Accord-
ingly, the court's analogy to Bigham may have little precedential value. This
conclusion is bolstered by the statement of the Claytor court that when "the
evidence [is] insufficient to sustain the action for strict tort liability, it naturally
follows that the actions based on implied warranty and negligence must
likewise fail."47
Bragg's other contention of interest 4 was that the jury should have
been charged that a manufacturer's "duty to warn is continuous and not
interrupted by manufacture or sale of the product."49 The question of a
manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn is an emerging issue on which the courts
are split, and no previous South Carolina court had ruled on this important
issue. The court upheld the trial ruling that a manufacturer has no duty to
retrofit products or inform previous purchasers of newly developed safety
devices."0 This rule places South Carolina in line with the majority of
jurisdictions." The court further noted that this was an appropriate charge in
light of the trial court's determination that Hi-Ranger had complied with the
applicable 1984 safety standards. 2
Bragg's final assignment of error concerned a charge of the sophisticat-
ed user defense. This defense maintains that there is "no duty to warn of
potential risks or dangers inherent in a product if the product is distributed to
... a sophisticated user who... [can] warn the ultimate user of any alleged
inherent dangers."53 The court held that this was proper because Bragg's
employer, the Y.C. Ballenger Company, was a large electrical contractor who
46. See supra text accompanying note 29.
47. Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132. The court observed that the common
element that must be proved in all three theories of recovery is that the product is not "reasonably
fit or safe for its intended use." Id. This language is drawn from the Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-314 and is the implied warranty analogue to the "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" terminology of Section 402A.
48. Bragg also contended that the jury instructions on the negligence claim were misleading
and partially devoid of applicable law. He argued that the trial judge should have adopted Bragg's
proposed jury charges on assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and intervening or
superseding negligence. The court found that, although the exact language desired by Bragg had
not been used, the trial court had accurately charged the jury on all three concepts. Bragg, -
S.C. at , 462 S.E.2d at 330.
49. Id. at 462 S.E.2d at 330-31.
50. Id. at , 462 S.E 2d at 331.
51. Id. at , 462 S.E.2d at 331 (adopting a rule set out in Romero v. International
Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992)). See generally DAVID G. OWEN ET AL.,
PRODUCTS LIABILrrY AND SAFETY (3d ed. 1996) (comprehensive discussion of the issue).
52. Bragg, _ S.C. at __, 462 S.E.2d at 331.
53. Id. at , 462 S.E.2d at 331 (quoting the trial court's jury instructions).
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owned a number of bucket trucks and was familiar with the dangers of using
conductive hydraulic hoses. 4
Bragg ultimately is most valuable for establishing that South Carolina
imposes no post-sale duty to Warn consumers of later developed safety devices.
This aspect of the decision is a clear victory for defendants, as is the
reaffirmation of the sophisticated-user defense. It should be noted, however,
that these holdings were applied only to Bragg's negligence claim; whether
they may be extended to strict liability actions remains an open question.
Finally, the holding that negligence claims can go forward when strict
liability claims cannot should be treated with care. It would seem to require an
uncommon factual situation in which the negligence claim stands apart from
the products liability action itself. Moreover, it appears quite plainly inconsis-
tent with the supreme court's holding in Claytor.
Stephen B. Samnuels
54. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 332.
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